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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
JANET SUE JOHNSON,

J

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

:
:

vs.

:
:

Case No. 870241-CA

:

Priority No. 14(b)

VAL BUDGE JOHNSON
Defendant and
Respondent.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred
upon the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to the Rule 3(a) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

This is an appeal from a

final order or judgement of the Second Judicial District Court.
Legislation creating the Utah Court of Appeals granted this Court
the specific authority to review decisions in domestic relations
cases.

The original action herein was an action for divorce.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of a judgement rendered by the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist awarding child support, alimony, and dividing
the estate of the parties.

The judgement was entered on May 22,

1987, and the Notice of Appeal was timely filed on June 19, 1987.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether the Appellant

should be awarded a monetary

interest in Respondent's medical license.
2.
in

Whether the Trial Court erred in the method it adopted

assessing

the

value

of

Respondent's

interest

in

the

professional corporation, Associates of Pathology.
3.

Whether the trial court erred by basing

its award of

alimony upon a projected future income which was substantially
below the average income of Dr. Johnson in the preceding

five

years.
4.

Whether

$1,000.00

per

the Appellant

month

alimony

should
for

120

be awarded more
months

based

than
upon

Respondent's average earnings over the last five years of between
$150,000.00 and $190,000.00, Appellant having no outside earnings
of her own.
5.

Whether the trial court erred in limiting child support

to $648.00 per child per month based upon its interpretation of
the Uniform Child Support Schedule to mean that a supporting
parent who earns more than $120,000.00 per year should not be
assessed more than a parent making only $120,000.00 because the
Schedule does not extend beyond a parental income of $120,000.00.
6.

Whether the Appellant

should be awarded one half of

Respondent's income during the time the two were separated, but
prior to their divorce.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married on August 19, 1966, and they were
separated on or about February lf 1986.

An action for Separate

Maintenance was filed by the Appellant and an action for Divorce
was filed by way of Counterclaim by Respondent.

The matter was

heard in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber
County, State of Utah, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding,
on the 20th and 23rd days of March, 1987.
The parties married after the Respondent had completed one
year of medical school.

Respondent's parents paid costs incurred

by Respondent for tuition and books only during his schooling.
While the Respondent attended Medical School in St. Louis,
Missouri, Appellant was employed by the St. Louis Globe Democrat,
and except for the tuition and the books, she

supported

Respondent during his remaining three years of medical school.
Respondent's contribution to his medical school expenses were
that he obtained a small scholarship during his final year of
medical school in the sum of $400.00, and he had a part-time job
during his third and fourth years of medical school.

The average

weekly pay from his part time employment was $150.00 per month.
He had the part time job for a period of 21 months.

Other that

the contributions mentioned above, the sole supporter of the
family during the final three years of Respondent's medical
school training, was the Appellant, Mrs. Johnson.
Following graduation from medical school, the respondent
began a one-year internship.

Appellant continued to work during
3

this one-year period, contributing her earnings to the support of
the family.

Following

completion of a one year

internship,

Respondent began training as a resident in pathology.

At that

time, the parties mutually decided to begin their family.

The

parties further agreed that Appellant would not continue to work,
but would serve the family as a full-time homemaker and mother.
Appellant terminated her work, and over the next few years three
children were born to the marriage.
Appellant earnings from The St. Louis Globe Democrat

gross

were about $13,960.00, which approximately equalled the estimated
costs of supporting the family during that time which was roughly
$14,725.00.

The

figure

of

$14,725.00

was

calculated

by

multiplying $475.00, the estimated monthly cost of living during
the time Dr. Johnson was in medical school, by the 31 months he
spent in school.
Upon graduation from medical school, the Dr. Johnson served
his internship with the Public Health
Washington.

Service

in

Seattle,

He was an intern from July 1969, through July, 1970.

Thereafter, he became served his residency with the Public Health
Service in Seattle, Washington, from June, 1970 to June, 1974. In
that month, Respondent accepted a position with his present
employer, Associates of Pathology, Inc., of Ogden, Utah, where he
continues

to be employed

at the

present

time.

By

mutual

agreement and consent of the parties, Mrs. Johnson has not been
employed outside the home since 1970, and although she received a
Bachelor of Arts Degree from Weber Sate College, she has not
4

pursued any career as a result of that degree, due to her
commitment as a homemaker.
At the time of the trial in March of 1987, the parties had
assets with a fair market value of approximately $850,000.00 to
$900,000.00.

(See, Exhibit entitled "Proposal for Settlement"

dated 1/20/87 entered as evidence during opening arguments by Mr.
Farr, Tr. p. 10, Exhibit No. unknown).

These assets consisted of

real and personal property including stocks, bonds, cash, pension
and retirement funds.

The parties have agreed that the

aforementioned assets would be divided equally, with each party
receiving approximately 50 percent of their value.
In. 4-10).

(Tr. p. 7,

The tangible assets have been divided by agreement of

the parties.
At trial, Appellant put on evidence to establish the value
of Respondent's interest in the professional
Associates of Pathology.

corporation,

To estimate the value of Respondent's

interest in the aforementioned corporation, Appellant retained
the services of the accounting firm of KBMG-Peat Marwick, the
fourth largest accounting firm in the world, (Tr. p. 58, lines
15-22), with offices in Salt Lake City, Utah, as expert witnesses
with respect to the value of respondent's medical practice.
Merrill Norman (Tr. pp. 57-206) and John Brough (Tr. pp. 111-113)
testified as expert witnesses from that firm at the District
Court Trial.

The accountants did extensive research into the

valuation of the medical practice, their accounting services
totalling more than $8,000.00.

However, in spite of the effort
5

and

expertise

that went

into the valuation

of the medical

practice by Appellant's experts, the trial court held that the
accountant's valuation of the medical practice was not credible.
(Conclusions of Law, No. 4 ) .
Although the trial court awarded the Appellant a 50 percent
interest in the Respondent's medical practice, (Conclusions of
Law No. 9) the manner in which the trial court valued the medical
practice is disputed.
defendant's

The trial court held "That the value of

interest

in

the

Associates

professional corporation, is $14,521.00."
18).

of

Pathology,

a

(Findings of Fact, No.

The trial court valued the Dr. Johnson's interest in the

professional corporation by adopting the method of valuation
proposed

by

the

Respondent,

and

used

corporation in their buy-out agreement.

by the

professional

(See Plaintiff's Exhibit

9-D referred to in the transcript of the record at pp. 119-20).
Essentially, the buy-out agreement states that in the event that
a member of Associates
professional

of

Pathology

decides

to

leave

the

corporation, or dies, the equipment, the cash on

hand, and the accounts receivable are added together and the sum
of those assets constitutes the worth of the leaving member's
portion of the association.
Appellant argued at trial that the Respondent's portion of
Associates of Pathology, should be valued as an ongoing concern,
rather than according to the buy-out agreement referred to above,
which contemplates the termination of a member's interest in the
corporation.
6

According to the method of valuation used by Appellant's
expertsf the Respondent's portion of the association, valued as a
going concern, was approximately $154,997.00, (see Exhibit 8-P).
The trial court adopted the method of valuation proposed by
Respondent

referred

to above, and determined

the value of

Respondent's medical practice to be the total of Respondent's
equipment, cash on hand, and accounts receivable, which was
valued at $14,521.00.

(Findings of Fact, No. 18).

According to

the trial court's determination, the Appellant was awarded fifty
percent of the $14,521.00, or $7,260.50.

(Conclusions of Law No.

9).
The trial court awarded the Appellant $1,000.00 per month in
alimony

for a period

of ten years, or until

remarries, cohabits with another, or dies.

the

Appellant

(Conclusions of Law

No. 8 ) .
Child support was awarded to the Appellant in the amount of
$648.00 per child per month.

(Conclusions of Law No. 3 ) . At the

trial, the parties agreed that the child support be based upon
the Uniform Child Support Schedule as used by the courts in the
Second Judicial District.

(Tr. p. 12, In. 8)

However, the

parties disagreed as to whether the Uniform Schedule was to have
a ceiling, or whether it was meant to be extended at the same
percentage rates until the child support becomes
with the supporting
Appellant's
Schedule

parent's

income.

commensurate

(Tr. at 12-13).

position is that the Utah Uniform Child
arbitrarily

ends

at
7

an

annual

income

The

Support

level

of

$120,000.00 and was meant to continue to extend the child support
amounts at the same rates until a figure is arrived at that
coincides with the income of the parent paying the child support.
Respondent's position at trial was that The Uniform Child
Support Schedule was intended to have a ceiling, beyond which
point, an increase in the supporting parent's income will not
increase the amount awarded as child support.

Dr. Johnson's

income for 1986 was $190,580.00, (see Defendant's answers to
Plaintiff's interrogatories, and Tr. pp. 46-49) which amount was
not on the Uniform Child Support Schedule because the schedule
does not extend beyond a $120,000.00 annual parental income.

The

Trial Court held that "the maximum income figure used for child
support pursuant

to the Uniform

Child

Support

Schedule

of

$10,000.00 per month recognizes that even though a father's
income may be higher, the cost of raising and supporting

said

children locally will not increase although the father's income
may exceed the $10,000.00 per month figure."

(Findings of Fact

No. 27, see also, Memorandum Decision No. 5 ) .
The trial court awarded $648.00 per month per child for each
of the parties three children because the Uniform Child Support
Schedule

stops

at an

annual

income

level of $120,000.00.

According to Appellant, if the Schedule would have been extended
according to the rates used in the Schedule, the amount payable
as child support would have been $1,047.00 per month per child
for each of the parties three children.

8

(Tr. p. 12).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I.

The Appellant believes that a medical license should be

considered

as property subject to division between spouses, in

spite of the Court of Appeals decision in Peterson v. Peterson,
58 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, (Ct. App. 1987), and wishes to raise the
issue in the event that the matter goes to the Supreme Court of
Utah.

POINT II.

Appellant contends that the method of valuation by

which the trial court determined the worth of the Respondent's
medical practice was not a fair representation of the true value
of the practice because the trial court used the dissolution
agreement between the doctor members of Associates of Pathology
to determine the value of an on-going practice.

Mrs. Johnson was

not a party to the buy-out agreement between the doctors.

POINT III.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred

by basing its award of alimony upon a projected future income of
Dr. Johnson which was substantially below the doctor's

income

level of the previous five years.

POINT IV.

Appellant contends that the trial court's award of

$1,000.00 per month alimony for 120 months is inadequate, and,
considering the factors used by the Utah courts, and recent
awards by other Utah courts in similar situations, it is far from
being a reasonable award in view of the fact that the wife had
9

not worked for over 17 years, that she had no outside income, her
standard of living, her needs, and the fact that the husband's
1986 income was more than $190,000.00.

POINT V.

Appellant would argue that the Uniform Child Support

Schedule, relied upon by the trial court in determining the
amount of child support, was not intended to put a ceiling, upon
all

child

support payable, but should

continue

at the

same

percentage rates until the figures are in line with the income of
the father.

POINT

VI.

Appellant

contends

that she is entitled

to an

equitable interest in Respondent's post-separation, pre-divorce
income.

Appellant should not be penalized for the time in which

the parties were separated by being refused one half of the
Respondent's income during that time.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE
INTEREST IN RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL LICENSE
Following trial of this case at the District Court, the Utah
Court of Appeals, in the case of Peterson v. Peterson, 58 Utah
Adv. Rep. 28, (Ct. App. 1987), held that a medical degree or
license is not property

subject to division between spouses.

Because the same issue was relied upon by the Appellant in this
10

case, and because the issue has not as yet been heard by the
Supreme Court of Utah, the Appellant herein raises the issue in
the event that it reaches the Supreme Court of Utah.
Appellant's experts valued Respondent's medical degree and
or license at $1,156,426.00.

Briefly, the value was calculated

by subtracting the average income of a college graduate at age 44
in 1987, from the annual income of the average pathologist at age
44, in 1987.

The average pathologist works until the age of 62.

According to the national average for pathologists, Dr. Johnson
has a worklife expectancy of 18 years.

The difference in the

income of the average pathologist, less the income of the average
college graduate, multiplied by 18 and reduced to a present day
value equals $1,156,426.00.

(See Exhibit 8-P entitled "Summary

of Valuation Methods").
According

to Appellant's experts, Dr. Johnson makes

$6,437.00 per month more than the average college graduate, and
$2,785.00 per month more than the average pathologist in the
United States.

Appellant's experts claim that Dr. Johnson's

association with Associates of Pathology is the reason that he
makes more than the average pathologist of his age.

Appellant

contends that the medical degree or license has value and that it
should be considered as a property interest to be divided between
the spouses.

11

POINT II
THE VALUATION METHOD EMPLOYED BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE RESPONDENT'S
MEDICAL PRACTICE DID NOT LEAD TO A FAIR ASSESSMENT
OF THE VALUE OF RESPONDENT'S ON-GOING MEDICAL PRACTICE.
At trial, the judge awarded Mrs. Johnson one half of the
value of Respondent's medical practice, with this portion of the
trial court's decision the Appellant has no argument.

However,

the trial court based the value of the Respondent's portion of
the medical practice upon a dissolution agreement entered into by
the members of Associates of Pathology.

By adopting this method

of valuation, Appellant

the

discretion.

argues

that

court

abused

its

The net effect of the trial court's adoption of

Respondent's method of valuation, was to take Appellant's fifty
percent interest in her husband's on-going medical practice from
an estimated value of $77,498.50, according to the Appellant's
experts, to an estimated value of $7,260.50 according the buy-out
agreement formula.
The buy-out agreement of Associates of Pathology, adopted by
the trial court in determining the value of Respondent's portion
of the association, provides a formula by which an associate's
portion of the professional

corporation

is determined

for

purposes of reaching a pay-off figure in the event that a partner
leaves the association, or dies.

The value of Dr. Johnson's

portion of Associates of Pathology, according to this method, as
adopted by the trial court was $14,521.00, of which Mrs. Johnson
was awarded 50 percent, or $7,260.50.
Essentially, the buy-out agreement states that in the event
12

a member of Associates of Pathology leaves the corporation or
dies, the value of the equipment, cash on hand, and the accounts
receivable are totalled and the resulting figure constitutes the
worth of the departing member's portion of the association, which
he or his heirs is entitled to receive upon disassociation with
the other doctors.
The Appellant argued at trial that the Respondent's portion
of Associates of Pathology, should be valued as an ongoing
concern, rather than as a close-out, because Dr. Johnson did not,
nor is he planning, to leave the association.

On the contrary,

he is probably going to work within the association until he
retires, barring some unforseen event.
According to the method of valuation used by Appellant's
experts, the Respondent's portion of the association, valued as a
going concern, was approximately

$154,997.00.

At trial,

Respondent offered no evidence to refute the Appellant's
valuation of Dr. Johnson's portion of Associates of Pathology as
an on-going enterprise, but argued only that the value of the
doctor's portion of the corporation should be computed according
to the corporation's buy-out agreement.
To summarize Appellant's argument, the Respondent's portion
is worth far more than the value of his medical equipment,
accounts receivable, and the cash on hand at a fixed time.

The

method employed by the trial court in assessing the value of Dr.
Johnson's interest in Associates of Pathology, fails to consider
good-will, and the fact that the enterprise is an on-going
13

concern that will continue to produce income until Dr. Johnson
either retires or dies.

At age 44, Dr. Johnson

has 21 years

until he reaches age 65, and 18 years until he reaches age 62,
the age at which the average pathologist in the United
retires.

States

The trial court has clearly abused its discretion by

failing to consider Dr. Johnson's interest in Associates of
Pathology as an on-going concern.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY BASING ITS AWARD OF
ALIMONY UPON A PROJECTED FUTURE INCOME WHICH
WAS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW DR. JOHNSON'S INCOME
IN EACH OF THE PRECEDING FIVE YEARS.
In the trial court's Memorandum

Decision, at No. 5, the

court found that Dr. Johnson's annual income was approximately
$130,000.00 to $155,000.00.

At trial, the Appellant

offered

evidence that Respondent's pension plan should also be counted as
income, because even though money put into the pension plan will
not

be

included

discretionary

as

income

income and

doctor's annual income.

for tax purposes, the money

should

be included

(Tr. at pp. 206-207).

as part of

is
the

Doctor Johnson

put $25,000.00 to $30,000.00 into a pension plan every year.
From the trial court's findings of fact, it appears as if the
court did not include that amount as part of Dr. Johnson's annual
income.
Dr. Johnson had annual incomes for the past five years as
indicated in Dr. Jonnson's answers to interrogatories.
following

The

figures represent Dr. Johnson's income for the past
14

five years:

1982

Wages
$54,000.00
Dividends, interest, and bonds
$11,606.00
Bonus
$51,500.0 0
Contribution to profit sharing and pension plan...$25,000.00 *
Total 1982 income

$142,106.00

1983
Wages
$54,000.00
Dividends, interest, and bonds
$13,257.00
Bonus
$66,560.0 0
Contribution to profit sharing and pension plan...$30,000.00 *
Total 1983 income

$163,817.00
1984

Wages
$60,000.00
Dividends, interest, and bonds
$15,967.00
Bonus
$93,500.00
Contribution to profit sharing and pension plan...$30,000.00 *
Total 1984 income

$199,467.00
1985

Wages
$60,000.00
Dividends, interest, and bonds
$17,152.00
Bonus
$72,980.0 0
Contribution to profit sharing and pension plan...$30,000.00 *
Total 1985 income

$180,132.00
1986

Wages
$69,000.00
Dividends, interest, and bonds
$10,000.00
Bonus
$81, 580. 00
Contribution to profit sharing and pension plan...$30,000.00 *
Total 1982 income

$190,580.00

*
The amounts contributed to the profit sharing plan, and the
pension plan were disputed.
However, the figures were included
in Appellant's total income figures.
Appellant

contends

that

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion by undervaluing the income of Dr. Johnson for purposes
of awarding alimony and child support.
15

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY IS INSUFFICIENT
AND AN ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION CONSIDERING THE
FINANCIAL CONDITION AND NEEDS OF MRS. JOHNSON,
THE ABILITY OF MRS. JOHNSON TO PRODUCE A SUFFICIENT
INCOME FOR HERSELF, AND THE INCOME OF DR. JOHNSON.

A.

The Court of Appeals has the authority to fashion its own
remedy as a substitution for that of the trial court.
In the case of Berry v. Berry, 635 P. 2d 68 (Utah 1981),

the Utah Supreme Court held that,
"There is no fixed formula which a trial judge
in a divorce action must follow in making
divisions of properties, but it is the
prerogative of the Court to make whatever
disposition it deems fair, equitable, and
necessary for the protection and welfare of
the parties." Id., at 69.
The
Findings

Appellate
and

Court

Judgment

differently, but would
evidence

clearly

will

merely

not disturb

a trial

court's

because

views

matter

do so only

preponderates

it

a

if it appeared

against

the

that

trial

the

court's

findings, or that the trial court misapplied the law, or abused
its discretion, so that an injustice has resulted.

It is the

trial court's duty to divide the property and income in a divorce
proceeding so that the parties may readjust their lives to the
new situation as well as possible, but there is no fixed rule or
formula for the distribution of a marital estate.

Turner v.

Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982).
However, it is the duty and prerogative of the Court of
Appeals, in equity matters where the occasion warrants, and after
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a review of both the facts and the law, to fashion its own remedy
as a substitution for the judgment of the trial court.

Penrose

v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1982).
B.

The trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider
the value of Dr. Johnson's medical degree when awarding
alimony.
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion

when it failed to consider the value of the husband's medical
degree when it awarded alimony to the wife.
In the recent case of Peterson v. Peterson, 58 Utah Adv.
Rep. 28 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court, while refusing to term the
husband's medical degree as "marital property1' for purposes of
a division of assets, the court did take into account the value
of the degree in the form of alimony.

In Peterson, the trial

court held that the husband's medical degree had a present value
of $120,000.00, and therefore gave the wife $1,000.00 per month
for 120 months in addition to a $1,000.00 per month alimony
award.

In the present case, the trial court held that the Dr.

Johnson's medical degree has no value as divisible marital
property, and gave the wife only $1,000.00 per month as alimony,
not taking into consideration the value of the husband's medical
degree.
In Peterson, the trial court found that the husband was
capable of making $100,000.00 per year, and alimony in the amount
of $1,000.00 per month was awarded on that basis.

Additionally,

the trial court held that the husband's medical degree had a
present day value of $120,000.00 and awarded the wife that amount
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in monthly installments of $1,000.00 for 120 months.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held in Peterson, that
the husband's medical degree was improperly valued as marital
property by the trial court, but upheld the award of $120,000.00
by granting the value of the medical license to the wife in the
form of alimony.

In the present case the husband made over

$190,000.00 in 1986, based upon that figure alone, the trial
court awarded the wife $1,000.00 per month alimony.
In Peterson the Court discussed the factors to be used in
determining a reasonable amount of alimony.

Those factors, taken

from the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), are:
(1) the financial condition and needs of the wife;
(2) the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient
income for herself;
(3) the ability of the husband to provide support.
Id. at 1075.
In discussing the third factor, the Court in Peterson stated:
This is the proper realm in which to consider
advanced degrees or professional licenses. An
advanced degree is ordinarily an indicator of
potential future earnings. In addition, the
attainment of a degree by one spouse often
results in a disparity of income that is likely
to last for a great time, particularly in cases
like the present one. Dr. Peterson has a history
of earning more than $100,000.00 a year and Mrs.
Peterson has not worked for the past fifteen.
But it is the discrepancy of their earning power
which is the basis for alimony, not the discrepancy
of their educations. There is no logical reason,
for example, for treating differently a self-trained
artist without formal education who earns and will
earn $100,000.00 a year and a doctor with a medical
degree who earns and will earn $100,000.00 a year.
Peterson, Utah Adv. Rep. at 32.
In Peterson, while the Court did not award a monetary value to
the husband's medical degree in the form of marital property, the
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degree was considered, and the Court of Appeals reflected the
value of the medical degree in the form of an alimony award.
In the present case the trial court failed to attach a value
to the husband's medical degree when it awarded the alimony.

In

this case, even though the husband makes almost twice as much as
the husband in Peterson, the alimony awarded was exactly one half
of that awarded in Peterson.

That fact alone is good reason to

believe there has been an abuse of discretion, but in addition to
granting

an unreasonably

low alimony

award

based

upon

the

husband's annual income, the trial court did not even consider
the potential earning capacity of the Respondent because of his
medical degree.
C.

The alimony awarded to Mrs. Johnson by the trial court
is insufficient to maintain her present standard of living.
In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 P.2d

1066 (Utah 1951), the

Court held that where there are sufficient assets and income to
do so, a wife against whom a divorce decree has been entered is
entitled to be provided for according to her station in life and
as demanded by her condition of health and lack of ability to
work.

The facts in the present case are that Mrs. Johnson, who

has devoted the past seventeen years of her life to the rearing
of Mr. Johnson's children, and supporting Mr. Johnson while he
attended Medical

school, has forgone career opportunities in

which she could have used her bachelor of arts degree in business
administration to conceivably advance a career considerably.
Mrs. Johnson is entitled to be provided for according to her
19

station in life.

As a doctor's wife, Mrs. Johnson has led a life

of extensive travel, and her social involvement has required that
she maintain a certain level of respect and dignity among her
peers.

To force Mrs. Johnson to lower her standard of living in

order to meet the needs of her position would run contrary to the
intent for which alimony is provided.
In Bushell v. Bushell, 649, P.2d 85 (Utah 1983), where the
ex-wife testified at trial that she needed alimony to repair the
roof on her home, to pay the utilities, and to obtain additional
training so that she could secure a job which pays adequately.
The court considered

her financial

conditions and needs and

reiterated the rule set forth in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P. 2d 144
(Utah 1978), which is that:
The purpose of alimony is to provide support
for a wife as nearly as possible at the standard
of living she enjoyed during marriage and to
prevent her from becoming a public charge.
Id., at 147.
The trial court appears to have disregarded the observation
of the court
penalty,

because

maintenance.
1980).

in Gramme that alimony

is not a reward, nor a

it is a post-marital

duty of support

and

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah

In MacDonald, Defendant made the argument that:
she was entitled to be provided for according
to her station in life and as demanded by her
condition of health and lack of ability to work;
that she should not be cast aside in her helpless
condition to 'sink or swim' or depend of others."

The court agreed with the argument and added that this was
part of the continuing responsibility of the marriage covenant:
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" . . . in sickness, in health; for better of worse
promise cannot be entirely avoided, even by divorce.

" This
In the

present case it appears that Defendant is expected to do just
what the court in MacDonald was trying to avoid, "sink or swim".
The court found in Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah
1983), that an award of only $100.00 per month alimony was an
abuse of discretion

because

it would not afford the wife a

standard of living close to the standard of living enjoyed by the
parties during the marriage.

The Higley case involved a thirty

year marriage and the husband's gross income was $23,356.80 per
year.

The court

found

that the husband had the ability to

provide permanent support in an amount greater than $100.00 per
month.
The Court observed in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P. 2d 144 (Utah
1978), that:
the purpose of alimony is to provide
post-marital support; it is intended neither
as a penalty imposed on the husband nor as
a reward granted to the wife. Its function
is to provide support for the wife as nearly
as possible at the standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage to prevent her
from becoming a public charge. Important
criteria in delivering a reasonable award
for support and maintenance are the financial
conditions and needs of the wife, considering
her station in life; her ability to produce
sufficient income for herself; and the ability
of the husband to provide support. Id.., at 147.
In addition to providing

support

for the wife as nearly

as

possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage,
the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Olson v. Olson, 704 P. 2d
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564 (1985), in further describing the purpose of alimony stated;
An alimony award should, as far as possible,
equalize the parties' respective standards of
living and maintain them at a level as close
as possible to the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage. Id., at 566, emphasis added.
In the present case, because the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to award reasonable alimony, Mrs. Johnson
will be deprived of her ability to live in the manner she was
accustomed to and will be precluded from other luxuries that were
the culmination of the parties' joint efforts over the 21 years
of their marriage.

It is the responsibility of the trial court

to endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of their
economic resources so that the parties might reconstruct
lives on a happy and useful basis.
697

(Utah

1974).

In

their

Searle v. Searle, 522 P. 2d

a dissolution

of

the marriage

of a

substantial duration, the objective is that the parties separate
on as equal a basis as possible.

The Utah Court of Appeals in

Peterson, the most recent Utah case on alimony, quoted from
Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court in
Savage stated:
Where a marriage is of long duration and the
earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds
that of the other, as here, it is appropriate
to order alimony and child support at a level
which will ensure that the supported spouse and
children may maintain a standard of living not
unduly disproportionate to that which they would
have enjoyed had the marriage continued. Id.., at
1205.
In the present case the Appellant is left with no means of
income other than alimony, and that alimony is $1,000.00.
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On the

other hand, according to

Respondent's answers to Appellant's

interrogatories, Respondent had a gross income in 1986 of
$190,580.00, or a gross monthly income of $15,881.66.

To award

the Appellant a mere $1,000.00 per month alimony, in view of the
Respondent's income is an obvious abuse of discretion by the
trial court.
D.

The trial court failed to consider all of the factors
required by the Utah Supreme Court in determining alimony.
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d

1072 (1985), the Court recited the three factors that must be
considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award:
(1) the financial conditions and needs of the
wife:
(2)
the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and
(3)
the ability of the husband to provide
support. Id., at 1075.
The Court in Jones, held that because the trial court, had failed
to apply the three factors used in determining alimony, it had
abused its discretion.

The Utah Supreme Court in Jones stated:

Nowhere in the trial court's memorandum
decision, its findings of fact, or its
statements made on the record at the
conclusion of the hearing is there any
indication that the court analyzed the
circumstances of the parties in light of
these three factors. And our attempt to
perform this analysis through a review of
the record evidence compels us to conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion
in fixing alimony award. Id.
In the case at hand, there is no reference in the trial
court's Memorandum Decision, or Findings of Fact, that the three
factors described in Jones, were considered in fixing an alimony
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award.

The only factor that appears to have been considered by

the trial court in determining the

amount of alimony was the

third factor, "the ability of the husband to provide support".
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Olson v. Olson, 704
P.2d 564, (1985), held that the trial court abused its discretion
in awarding

alimony

where

"the record

contains

only

scant

indication... of the court's consideration of the first of the
three factors, the financial condition and the needs of the
wife....
to any

In the present case, the trial court made no references
of

discussed

the
the

three

factors

Mr. Johnson's

mentioned
ability

in Jones, but only

to provide

support.

According to the precedence set by the courts of appeal in Utah,
the decision of the trial court in this case must be reversed for
the court's failure to consider all three of the factors required
for a proper determination of an alimony award.
In light of the unreasonably small award of alimony and the
case

law, it

is

evident

that

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion and in determining the amount of alimony to be awarded
to Appellant, due to the fact that the Factors to be considered
in determining alimony as set forth in Jones v. Jones, were not
adhered to as required by the Utah Supreme Court.
E.

The trial court's award of alimony is substantially below the
rate at which other Utah courts have awarded spouses in
similar situations.
Appellant is aware that the trial court has a reasonable

amount of latitude within which it may make its decisions as to
the

proper

amount

of alimony, and Appellant
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respects

that

necessary degree of discretion which has been given to the
district courts.

However, a brief review of some recent Utah

alimony awards in which the parties are similarly situated,
quickly reveals the inequity that was done when the trial court
in the present case awarded only $1,000.00 per month alimony to
Mrs. Johnson.

In the most recent case of Peterson v. Peterson,

the parties were in much the same position as the parties in the
present case.

Both of the Husbands are medical doctors, in

Peterson, the parties had been married 20 years when they filed
for divorce, and they had six children.

In the present case, the

Johnsons have been married 21 years, with three children.

In

Peterson, Dr. Peterson was found to have an annual income of
about $100,000.00 per year.

In the present case, Dr. Johnson has

an annual income of almost double that of Dr. Peterson, he made
over $190,000.00 in 1986.

However, in spite of the fact that Dr.

Peterson makes only roughly one half of Dr. Johnson's salary, he
pays $2,000.00 per month alimony to Dr. Johnsons $1,000.00.
While Dr. Peterson's monthly alimony payment is roughly 24
percent of his monthly income, Dr. Johnson's monthly alimony
payment is about six percent of his monthly income, when a figure
of $190,000.00 is used as the annual income.
In other cases, where the husband's income is in the general
range of that of Dr. Johnson, the courts have generally awarded
much more substantial alimony awards.

In the case of Savage v.

Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court upheld
an award of $2,000.00 per month alimony to a wife who's husband
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had an annual income of $133,370.00.

In that case, the parties

had three children, and had been married
alimony

for 20 years.

The

in Savage, was approximately 18 percent of the monthly

income of the husband.
Another case of value in assessing the compatibility of the
alimony award in the present case with that of other similarly
situated parties is the case of Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d
406,

(Utah

1983).

In Yelderman, the husband was a medical

doctor, the parties had been married for about 25 years, and had
six children.
annually.

Dr. Yelderman earned

in excess of $100,000.00

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed

an

alimony award of $2,500.00 per month where Dr. Yelderman had an
annual income of over $100,000.00.
$120,000.00

Even if we use the figure of

for Dr. Yelderman's annual income, alimony paid by

Dr. Yelderman is 25 percent of his monthly

income, again

far

above the percent that Dr. Johnson pays, which is six percent of
his monthly income.
The

average

of

the

awards of alimony

in the cases of

Peterson, Savage, and Yelderman, figured as a percent of the
husband's monthly income was 22.3 3 percent.

iMrs. Johnson was is

awarded approximately 6 percent of Dr. Johnson's monthly income.
In this case, the trial court's award is approximately 73 percent
below the average of the three cases mentioned above.

Clearly,

such an award is an abuse of the trial court's discretion, in
view of the circumstances of this case, and should be modified to
reflect a more equitable figure.
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F.

The fact that Mrs. Johnson was awarded 50 percent of the
marital assets does not decrease her need for more
aTimony since the assets which she received as a result
of the property distribution do not produce income.
The parties reached an agreement as to distribution of their

marital

assets.

A breakdown of the division of assets

included in the document entitled
dated

1/20/87.

is

"proposal for Settlement",

The assets which Mrs. Johnson received are the

following:
House
Cars
Cabin
Boat
Furniture
1/2 of cash
1/2 of stock
cash for A of P ins. & stock
Share of pension trust

$130,000.00
llf000.00
10,000.00
11,000.00
12,000.00
42,602.00
18,644.00
9,309.00
228,372.00*
$472,927.00**

* The figure of $183,950.00 that was included in
the original Exhibit was adjusted to include
interest and deposits until April 1, of 1987,
the day in which the financial distribution was
made.
** This new total includes the adjustment made
to Mrs. Johnson's Share of the Pension Trust.
Appellant contends that the assets listed above should not
be considered as payment in lieu of alimony because these assets
cannot be used to maintain Mrs. Johnson on a day to day basis
without depleting her capital assets.

On the other hand, Dr.

Johnson has a continual income and a steady flow of cash with
which to put himself back in the position he was in before the
divorce.
Mrs. Johnson should be granted additional alimony so that
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she can live at her present standard of living without the need
to liquidate her assets in order to provide for her month to
month needs.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE UNIFORM CHILD SUPPORT SCHEDULE,
WHICH IT RELIED UPON IN DETERMINING CHILD
SUPPORT, SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO CONSIDER
ANNUAL INCOME LEVELS BEYOND $120,000.00.
The trial

court, in its Memorandum Decision, devoted a

rather lengthy portion of that document to a discussion of the
reasoning behind its interpretation of the Uniform Child Support
Schedule to intentionally cut off consideration of a supporting
parent's annual income beyond the $120,000.00 level. The trial
court stated:
5. The parties' stipulation reserves the
issue of child support. The Court finds
that the following of the child support
table's last line, that is for approximately
$120,000 per year, is proper. The Court
recognizes that the father's earnings likely
exceed that figure by $10,000 to $25,000 per
year. The exact income is deemed by the Court
to be immaterial. The Court's reasoning on
this matter is set out below.
This Judge wrote the first child support
guidelines in Utah. He also served on the
Utah Judicial Council when the first statewide
guidelines were adopted. The issue of how
high child support guidelines should go is
a matter of considerable debate. It may be
helpful to examine a somewhat similar case.
That case concerns a multi-millionaire's
divorce in Clearfield, Utah. The children
were left with the mother in the family home,
and everyone planned sic the children would
remain in the public schools and continue to
enjoy their friends and association in the
middle class neighborhood. This is very
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similar to the case at hand. The calculations
begin with the consideration of foodstuffs.
Milkf eggsf bread and vegetables, etc., cost
rich child close to the same as it costs a
middle class child. A rich child, by and
large, wears the same fashions as his peers.
The recreation is principally shared with
persons of his own age group. There are some
trips expected that will be taken with
grandparents, father, and occasionally with the
mother, that may be considered more exotic.
Doctors and dentists charge rich children and
middle class children a fixed rate. The bottom
line, arithmetically, was that once a child's
father gets to the $10,000.00 a month level, and a
child is raised locally, there is no effect on
sums spent actually rearing the child when the
father's income increases. One runs into a problem
similar to "Brewster's Millions". The Davis County
millionaire was the product of generations of rich
men, and their efforts to adjust. He concluded
that to give a child more than one and one-half
times the neighboring kids' allowance is to buy
your child problems. An analysis of the monthly
budget of this couple while they lived together,
and since the separation, supports the hypothesis
that prudence does not indicate that anymore sic
should be spent on child support in the future than
was spent on the child care while the father lived
at home. This couple actually spent less while the
father lived in the home than is indicated in the
child support guidelines in the tables. It is
not the purpose of child support to provide savings
and/or estates. Savings and estates are matters
that are controlled by the parents and involve
other considerations.
The trial court acknowledged

in the preceding discussion

that, "the issue of how high child support should go is a matter
of considerable debate."

While the Appellant has the utmost

respect for the opinion of the trial court on the issue, the
Appellant's takes an opposing position from that of the trial
court.
The weakness of the trial court's theory, that the Uniform
Child Support Schedule was intentionally
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capped at an income

level of $120,000.00, is that if such an argument truly were the
case, the trial court's analysis fails to answer two questions:
(1) why does the schedule increase according to the income of the
supporting parent, and; (2) why was the annual income figure of
$120,000.00 chosen as the cut-off point?
If, as the trial court has supposed, a rich child can live
for about the same amount as a middle class child, then why does
the Schedule reflect any increase in child support payments in
conjunction with the supporting parent's income?

The logical

point at which the trial court's theory ends is that all children
can

live

for

a

certain

established

amount

if

the

only

considerations are the price of food, and generic clothing, as
determined by a sort of breadbasket list of items, the price of
which will change according to the economic situation.
If the purpose of the Schedule were to support a child at a
certain minimum standard, the support payments would not increase
with the parent's income as in the present Schedule.
In contrast to the trial court's theory of the Schedule, it
appears that the Schedule increases according to the parent's
income for a very simple reason, the same reason that alimony is
more for a wife married to a rich man than it is for a woman
married to a poor man, because the purpose of alimony

is to

maintain a standard of living as near as possible to that enjoyed
prior to the divorce, and to keep the child in the same lifestyle
as

that

enjoyed

before

the

divorce.

If

the

child

of a

Rockefeller is forced to live on the same amount of child support
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as a child of a person making $120,000.00 per year, the child
could conceivably be forced to make a drastic change in his or
her standard of living.

If Appellant accepts the trial court's

assumption that "a rich child, by and large, wears the same
fashions as his peers," and the child has rich children as peers,
the child may have to change his or her standard of living if the
amount of child support is not commensurate with past standards
of living.

Child support consists of much more than buying

"milk, eggs, bread, and vegetables...."
in upper middle class neighborhoods.

Housing costs are more

If the mother is forced to

move out of the neighborhood because she cannot afford to
continue to support the children in the manner they are
accustomed to, then the child could suffer.
The trial court stated that it based its conclusions upon
the assumption that the child was to continue to live in Utah, in
a middle class neighborhood, and attend public schools.

Even if

the child continued to live in Utah, he or she child would be
denied many opportunities that were present before the divorce.
The child may be denied the opportunities of music lessons,
travel abroad, private schools, tutors etc., that more income can
provide.
Parents work for a higher income so that they can enjoy what
that income provides, for their children, as well as themselves.
To say that child support beyond a certain level is unnecessary,
is clearly

denying

the

child

his or her

right

to

the

opportunities made possible by the effort their parents made to
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advance themselves, and their family.
Appellant finally contends that it is an abuse of discretion
to rely

solely

determining

upon

the Uniform Child

Support

a proper amount of child support.

Schedule
The

in

schedule

should be used only as a guideline, and should not have the
effect of excluding input, or limiting

the discretion of the

trial court.

POINT VI
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO FIFTY PERCENT OF
RESPONDENT'S INCOME DURING THE PERIOD THE
COUPLE WAS SEPARATED, YET PRIOR TO DIVORCE.
The parties separated on or about February 1, 1986.
trial

for

divorce

was

held

at

the

end

of

March,

The

1987.

Accordingly, Respondent had income of approximately 14 months
during that time.

On the other hand, Appellant had no income

during that time other than what was paid to her by Respondent.
Appellant's experts offered testimony at trial to the effect that
Respondents ' s share of the post-separation income exceeded the
Appellant's share by some $45,000.00.

These calculations

were

made after taxes and all other considerations were taken into
account.

Appellant maintains she should be awarded an equitable

interest in respondent's post-separation income as that income
was an asset of the marriage and

the parties

agreed

in the

Stipulation that all assets of the marriage should be divided
equally.
It is Appellant's position that the trial court misapplied
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Utah Law and made other substantial errors in its failure to
award to appellant certain assets, alimony, and interest in other
assets.

Moreover, it is the Appellant's position that these

issues are substantial and merit further proceedings and
consideration by the Court of Appeals.

CONCLUSION

The A p p e l l a n t , Mrs. Johnson believes t h a t the t r i a l

court

abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n when i t adopted Dr. J o h n s o n ' s method of
assessing

t h e v a l u e of

his

interest

in the

professional

corporation, Associates of Pathology, and t h a t for purposes of
assessing

Mrs. J o h n s o n ' s

s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l

assets,

the

i n t e r e s t of Dr. Johnson in the a s s o c i a t i o n should be reassessed
as an on-going concern.
Appellant

requests

t h a t This Court review t h e

figures

contained in t h i s b r i e f , and in the t r i a l court record, and award
an alimony amount t h a t i s r e a s o n a b l e , and in l i n e with other
persons s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d considering the l e n g t h of
t h e income of Dr. Johnson,
Johnson's a b i l i t y

marriage,

t h e number of c h i l d r e n ,

to support herself

at

and Mrs.

the present

time.

Appellant a l s o ask t h a t This Court remove the l i m i t of ten years
for the payment of alimony.
Appellant

believes

that

the

trial

court

erroneously

i n t e r p r e t e d the i n t e n t of the Uniform Child Support Schedule t o
limit

consideration

of

incomes of
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supporting

parents

to

$120,000.00 per year incomes and below.

Appellant asks that This

Court award child support to the children of Dr. Johnson at an
amount commensurate with Dr. Johnson's income, unlimited by the
arbitrary limitations imposed by the fact that the Schedule stops
at an annual income of $120,000.00.
Appellant believes that she is entitled to a fair portion of
the income earned by Dr. Johnson between the time of separation
and Divorce.

ADDENDUM
Attached.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

yQday

of December, 1987.

STEPHEN W. FARR
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, on this
1 (/)

day of December, 1987, to the following:
TIM W. HEALY (#7606)
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
863 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2630

nQirq Cfa, tibQ
Secretary
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A D D E N D U M
TIM W. HEALY, #7606
Attorney for Defendant
863 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2630
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JANET SUE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

^
.
1

vs.

>

VAL BUDGE JOHNSON,
Defendant.

'

FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No.

94737

,

The above entitled matter came before the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, presiding for trial on
the 20th day of March 1987 and again on the 23rd day of March
1987; plaintiff was present represented by her counsel, Stephen
W. Farr, Esq; defendant was present represented by his
counsel, Tim W. Healy, Esq. A stipulation of the parties
regarding the division of real and personal property was
read and acknowledged by the parties. Various witnesses
were sworn and testified and various items of documentary
evidence were received. Counsel for the respective parties
met again with the Court on April 22, 1987 for the purpose
of clarifying some items from the Memorandum Decision
and the Court being duly advised in the premises now
enters the following:
/
FINDINGS OF FACT
'A. That the Court has jurisdiction in this matter inasmuch
as both parties are actual and bona fide residents of
Weber/County, Utah.
2. That the parties were married in Salt Lake City,
Utah on August 19, 1966. They separated on or about
February 1, 1986. Each party is now requesting a divorce.

JOHNSON v JOHNSON
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Page Two
4/3. That three children have been born as issue of
the marriage, to-wit: Erik Val Johnson, born October 30,
1970; Jennifer Johnson, born January 22, 1973 and Jamie Anne
Johnson, born November 30, 1978.
That both parties have caused the other party pain
and anguish to such an extent that they are unable to continue
in the marital relationship with the other. Plaintiff's
cruelty was that she did not make a reasonable effort to
keep the romance alive and she gave priority to her church
work, children and personal interests and has caused her
husband, the defendant, to feel isolated and unappreciated
•//5. Plaintiff attempted marriage counselling approximately
five years ago. Defendant attempted to revive this counselling
in 1985 but plaintiff took no interest in that effort.
*/6. Defendant's cruelty consisted of having developed a
secret remance which plaintiff eventually discovered and she
filed for separate maintenance. Defendant counterclaimed for
divorce. Plaintiff has expressed a desire to continue the
marriage but does not plan any personal behavioral changes
toward the defendant. Plaintiff testified that defendant
plans to continue his relationship with another woman.
Si.
Pla intiff did obtain a college degree in business from
Weber State College prior to her marriage to defendant.
/€. That at the time of the marriage of the parties, defendant
had obtained his bachelor's degree and had completed one
year of medical school.
i/9. That plaintiff worked for approximately three years
following the marriage of the parties but has not worked in the
ensuing 17 years. Defendant also worked part-time for
two of the three years he was in medical school after the
parties were married.
fclO• That defendant's parents paid all of the expenses
for defendant's tuition and books during the time that he was
in medical school.
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v^Tl •

That defendant had a limited fellowship during

medical school which was a credit upon his tuition costs.
That defendant would have achieved a medical
degree with or without the plaintiff's limited contribution.
^Jr3.

That plaintiff has enjoyed the benefits and

fruits of defendant's medical degree for a substantial
period of time.
i/13.

That the articles of incorporation of defendant's

employer, The Associates of Pathology, are actually little
more than a partnership at will.
* / l4.

That the buy-out agreement fixed the buy-out figure

as a proportional share of fixed assets.
t/\5.

That there is no fixed contract of employment

with the hospitals served by the aforesaid corporation; it is
a going rate situation.
fl6.

That each doctor within the aforesaid professional

corporation bills the hospital and/or the other clients
for services rendered and the money is eventually divided
equally.
That the jnarket place has provided substitute or
new doctors.

New doctors come in substantially in the

same position as the doctors leaving said corporation.

The

rates charged by each pathologist are identical to the*
others and there is no specific reward for seniority or length
of service.
t/18.

That the value of defendant's interest in the

Associates of Pathology , a professional corporation, is
$14,521.00.
•19.

That one of the flaws in plaintiff's calculation of

the value of defendant's medical degree is the assumption
that the defendant's income would increase each year by a
fixed percentage.
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t/20.

That the basic income of defendant in his employment

with the Associates of Pathology will equal the normal charges
for piece work done by the pathologist at the direction of the
various hospitals and other clients.
that the

pay

There is no evidence

for this piecemeal service will increase; in

fact, the evidence is that it will lessen.

There is also

no evidence that the amount of piece work will increase or
that the number o«f doctors sharing the earnings from
the Associates of Pathology will decrease.
21?*/That the earnings of the defendant has levelled off

^

/afthe present rate for the expected future.

The projected

J/income for the defendant for 1987 including sfllft^y *r\c\
bonus is between $127,000 and $132,000 which income level
J.s pyppH^ri i-n ramain ^ncf^nt in the ensuing fpw y^ars.—
!2.

That the income of the defendant as well as the

other pathologists within the Associates of Pathology is
expected to be set by the fair market place in the future.
The

rates charged by each pathologist are identical to the

others

and there is no

specific reward for seniority or length

of service,
K &t jr
r

* JU^f ^*

2 3 ^ T h a t the earnings of the defendant as well as
s

f u t u r e potential have been considered by the Court for the

purpose of fixj^ng^alimony.
That each of the parties have employed their
attorney and relied upon said attorney in good faith.
./25.

That each party has funds with which they may pay their

own attorney.
i/76.

That the parties have acquired substantial real

and personal property during the course of their marriage
which should be equitably divided pursuant to the stipulation
of the parties.
y / 27.

That the maximum/figure used for child support

pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Schedule of $10,000 per

JOHNSON V JOHNSON
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Page Five

ymonth recognizes that even though a father's income may be
higher the cost of raising and supporting said children locally
will not increase although the father's income may exceed the
$10,00Q^per month figure.
«-^28. That plaintiff and defendant actually spent less
while defendant lived in the home for the support of the
children of the parties than is indicated in the child
support guidelines and the tables adopted by this judicial
district based upon defendant's income.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
r
. / l. That plaintiff and defendant should each be awarded
a decree of divorce from the other upon the grounds of
mental cruelty the same to become final upon signing and

entryy

{A.

That plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody
and control of the minor children of the parties subject to
reasonable rights of visitation by defendant.
t/3. That defendant should pay to plaintiff as and for
child support the sum of $648.00 per month per child commencing
with the month of April 1987.
That plaintiff's expert witnesses lack credibility
interest and
regarding the values placed on defendantTs/stock with the
Associates of Pathology and regarding the value of his
medical degree.
-^5. That defendant's expert witness has high credibility
regarding the value of defendant's interest and stock in the
Associates of Pathology as well as his earnings as a
medical doctor.
'lk 6. That defendant's medical degree should not be marital
property subject to division by the Court in a divorce action;*
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H 7. That defendant's earnings as well as his future potential
have been considered by the Court for the purpose of fixing
alimom
tx6. That defendant should pay to plaintiff as and for
alimony the sum of $1,000 per month commencing with the
month of April 1987. Said alimony should be paid to
plaintiff for a period of ten years or until plaintiff either
remarries, cohabits with another male person or dies. ^///#?-&
f/9.
That plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the value
in defendant's interest in the Associates of Pathology,
a professional corporation which total interest is in the sum
of $14,521.00.
That plaintiff should be awarded the family home of
the parties subject to assuming and discharging the outstanding
mortgage balance thereon and holding the defendant harmless therefrom.
That defendant should be entitled to claim the
two oldest children of the parties for income tax purposes
commencing in 1986. At such time as the oldest child of
the parties reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school
with his appropriate year group, whichever is later, that child
support should be discontinued. Defendant should then be
next
entitled to claim the/oldest child of the parties for income
tax purposes. At such time as just one child remains the
defendant should be entitled to claim said child for income
tax purposes every other year.
*f2. That each of the parties should bear the expenses
of their own expert witnesses as well as their own attorney
fees and costs.
That plaintiff should notbe entitled to any
portion of defendants 1986 or 1987 bonus inasmuch as these are
considered as part of defendant's overall annual income, provided,
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however, that such portions of defendant's 1986 bonus as were
previously allocated to the various savings and checking
accounts of the parties and formed part of the stipulation
of the parties should not be affected.
*^4 . That d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d be r e s p o n s i b l e for any and
a l l f e d e r a l and s t a t e income t a x e s owed by him upon h i s 1986
income.
/ ^ W < fotf ^
£&**'
- #fyT* <$«F/\Uc4*Cfa /fasc/ds^
fA]^
1 5 . That t h e p a r t i e s Siould be awarded t h e f o l l o w i n g tio^t^ rfovkjUik
r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y w i t h t h e v a l u e s i n d i c a t e d h e r e i n :
-""
Plaintiff
House
96,000 ^
$
Cars
11,000 ^
Cabin
10,000 ^
Boat
11,000 </
12,000 *S
Furniture
59,602 S
\ cash incl, $17,000
in Amer. 1st
18,644 ^
\ stock
Addt'l cash in lieu
of AofP stock & life ins.
y
cash value
9,309^
Share of pension trust
200,950 ^
$" 428,505

Defendant
Share of cash
H stock
FFCA-EF Hutton
South Gate Lodge
A of P stock
Life Ins. cash value
Loan to Dean
Muni bonds MLPF&S &
EF Hutton
Pension trust share
Car

43,791 -i
-including $20,000 in Continental Rank
18,644
checking

10,000
10,500
14,521
4,099
900
116,628

203 ,421
6,000

428*, 504

gyyj

37 J ^

gjj£^

,c. *P

The pension trust share of plaintiff & defendant as reflected
above was calculated as of 3/31/86. The additional amounts in
said pension trust share which have accrued as of 4/1/8? but which
figures are not/bailable shall be equally divided between the
parties and added to the pension shares of plaintiff & defendent
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KA6.6.

That the accumulated amounts in the pension &
profit sharing trusts for purposes of property division
should be as of April 1, 1987. Both the plaintiff and the
defendant should bear their own tax consequences from any
draw from these sums.
That the remaining items of personal property
including but not limited to silverware, china and porcelain
should be divided equally, traded against other items of
similar value or purchased for cash for the value of the
other party's interests.
» r
«^i8. That the defendant should receive the pmotp
,
equipment, the snow blower and the £tereo.) £U <~Tcf>l u
.
lX9.
That the plaintiff should be awarded the sewing
machines, ATV 3 wheeler and the parties should also
divide the Lennox china and the Lunt silverware or one
party may buy out the other party for one-half of the said
value.
,^6. That the parties should sign such Quit Claim
Deeds to real property as well as vehicle titles as may
be required to effect transfer of the aforesaid real and
personal property.
21. That any amounts in the savings and checking
lu*^
accounts cs well as ±ocks and bonds in excess of the amounts
as shown in paragraph 15 above should be equally divided.
22. That plaintiff's circumstances should not be
considered to have changed for purposes of modifying
alimony awarded herein so long as her earnings do not
exceed M^O'jg&r month.
DATED this

day of MAY, 1987.

DISTRICT JUDGE
Approved as to Form:
Attorney for Plaintiff

i
<

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JANET SUE JOHNSON,
i

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
VAL BUDGE JOHNSON,
•

Case No.

94737

Defendant.

Defense

counsel

is

invited

to

submit

findingsf

conclusions, and decree consistent with that indicated below.
he

has not

done

so within

two weeks

after

receipt

If

of this

decision/ plaintiff1s counsel is invited to do so.
FACTS
1.

The Court has jurisdiction of the case because of

the residency of both parties in Weber County.
2.
1986.

The parties were married in 1966f and separated in

Each party is now requesting a divorce.
3.

Each

party

has

been

cruel

to the

other.

The

plaintiff's cruelty is that she did not make a reasonable effort
to keep the romance alive.

She gave priority to her church work,

children, and personal interests.
feel

isolated

and

unappreciated.

counseling about five years ago.

This caused her husband to
She

attempted

marriage

Her husband attempted to revive
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this counseling in 1985f but the plaintiff took no interest in
that

effort.

unacceptable.

Defendant's solution to his problem
He developed

a secret

romance.

is legally

The plaintiff

eventually discovered the romance and filed for separate maintenance.

He

counterclaimed

for

divorce.

She

has a desire to

continue the marriage, but does not plan any personal behavior
changes towards her husband.
new romance.

He now plans to continue with his

The Court's conclusion is that each of the parties

are entitled to a divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty.

If

the parties agreef the divorce may be final at once.
4.
it

goes,

The Court accepts the parties' stipulation so far as

concerning

child

custody,

visitation,

division, etc., and rules on the remaining issues.

and

property

If any issue

is not here ruled on, or further guidance is needed, the Court is
available for conference.
5.
support.

The parties' stipulation reserves the issue of child

The Court finds that the following of the child support

table's last line, that is for approximately $120,000 per year,
is

proper.

The

Court

recognizes

that

the

father's earnings

likely exceed that figure by $10,000 to $25,000 per year.

The

exact

The

income

is deemed

by the

Court

to

be immaterial.

Court's reasoning on this matter is set out below.
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This Judge wrote the first child support guidelines in
Utah.

He also served on the Utah Judicial Council when the first

statewide guidelines were adopted.

The issue of how high child

support guidelines should go is a matter of considerable debate.
It may be helpful to examine a somewhat similar case.

That case

concerns a multi-millionaire's divorce in Clearfield, Utah.
children

were left

with

the mother

in

the

family

The

home, and

everyone planned the children would remain in the public schools
and continue to enjoy their friends and association in the middle
class neighborhood.
The

calculations

This is very similar to the case at hand.

begin

with

the

consideration

of

foodstuffs.

Milk, eggs, bread and vegetables, etc., cost a rich child close
to the same as it costs a middle class child.

A rich child, by

and large, wears the same fashions as his peers.

The recreation

is principally shared with persons of his own age group.
are some trip? expected

that will

There

be taken with grandparents,

father, and occasionally with the mother, that may be considered
more

exotic.

Doctors

and

dentists

middle class children a fixed rate.

charge

rich

children and

The bottom line, arithmatic-

ally, was that once a child's father gets to the $10,000 a month
level, and a child is raised locally, there is no effect on sums
spent

actually

rearing
runs

the

into

child
a

when

problem

the father's

similar

to

income

increases.

One

"Brewster's

Millions".

The Davis County millionaire was the product of
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generations

of

rich

men,

and

their

efforts

to

adjust.

He

concluded that to give a child more than one and one-half times
the neighboring kids1 allowance is to buy your child problems.
An analysis of the monthly budget of this couple while they lived
together, and since the separation, supports the hypothesis that
prudence does not indicate that anymore should be spent on child
support in the future than was spent on child care while the
father lived at the home.
the father lived

This couple actually spent less while

in the home than

support guidelines in the tables^

is indicated

in the child

It is not the purpose of child

support to provide savings and/or estates.

Savings and estates

are matters that are controlled by the parents and involve other
considerations.
6.

The parties did not stipulate on whether or not the

vJlQuse should be paid o^fv

The plaintiff should be allowed to

chose whether to take the cash and the obligation and/or pay off
the mortgage.

There is sufficient equity in the home that there

is little risk to the defendant.

The subject ^f alimonyyis not

covered

is the value

by the

stipulation, nor

of

the medical

doctor degree, nor the value of the defendant's position in the
professional corporation.
The plaintiff is awarded alimony at the rate of $1,000
to be continued under the general terms of alimony, but not to
exceed ten years.
is indicated below.

The Court's rationale in ruling on this matter
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The plaintiff has enjoyed the benefits of this medical
degree for a substantial period of the time.
The plaintiff did not create this degree.

Her contribu-

tion was a very limited financial one for three years and a few
months that she worked at I.R. S.

She earned about $14,000 during

that time and shared it with the defendant.

The defendant was

well on his way to the medical degree before this marriage.

He

had achieved his undergraduate education and the degree that made
his

acceptance

into

medical

accepted into medical school.
before the marriage.
parents

school

possible.

He

had

been

He had already completed one year

He had the support of his parents.

His

continued to pay all of his tuition and book charges

until the degree was obtained.

He had a limited fellowship.

He

worked part time for two of the three years the couple lived
together during medical school.

The evidence indicates that the

defendant would have achieved a medical degree with or without
the plaintiff1s limited financial contribution.
medical student.
in the future.

She married a

She will further enjoy the fruits of his study
She has received substantial sums of money that

his training has provided in the property settlement.

The child

support here awarded reflects his higher earning capacity.
7.

^

The stipulation does not cover ^f€torneysf fee^^or

the cost of ef£e1rt witnessed
expenses in this matter.

Each party shall bear their own
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Much of

the

trial

time

has

been

concerned with

the

p l a i n t i f f 1 s a l l e g a t i o n of the present value of the medical degree
and the stock exceeds a million d o l l a r s and that he should pay
The p l a i n t i f f ' s expert witness 1

her one-half.
the

value

of

the

medical

degree

and/or

testimony as
the

stock

to

lacks

credibility.
First l e t
position

usbe^-settce i ne d -w^Ui th e value of the stock

in t h ^ professional

corporationA

There

is

no

fixed

contract for employment winf~the h o s p i t a l s .

It i s a "going rate"

situation.

and

Each doctor

does

equal

work

gets

equal

pay

regardless of the number of years he has spend with' the group.
The a r t i c l e s

of

incorporation are actually

partnership at w i l l .

little

more than a

The buy out agreement f i x e s the buy out

figure as a porportional share of the fixed a s s e t s .

Each doctor

b i l l s the hospital for each servicer and the money i s eventually
s p l i t equally.

One of the principal benefits of the business

is

the arrangement makes i s possible for the corporation to pay into
a retirement fund sums that/

in e f f e c t ,

defer

taxation.

This

accumulation of funds for the purpose of d i v i s i o n in t h i s case
shall be calculated as of the value indicated by the defendant's
experts as of April 1, 1987.
dant must bear their
these sums.
by the

Both the p l a i n t i f f

own tax consequences

and the defen-

from any draw from

The value of these deferred earnings i s as indicated

defendants

experts.

The market

place

has 'provided
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s u b s t i t u t e or new doctors.

The new doctors come in substantially

in the same position as the leaving doctors.

This i s true of the

manner in which t h i s defendant was treated.

There i s no indica-

tion in the immediate future that the earnings of these doctors
will

exceed the simple value of

a pathologist's

services on a

piecemeal basis t o the hospitals.
8.

\The

value

of

the

plainfcir£f^s

expert

testimony as t o the worth of the(^M.D. d e g r e e / i s

not

witness
credible.

One of his flaws i s the assumption_^Ka"t^a doctor's income w i l l
(fincrease each year by a fixed percentage^

The basic income of

t h i s group i s on the formula that cash received w i l l equal the
normal charges for

piece work done by the pathologist

various h o s p i t a l ' s directions.

at

the

Unless the rate charged for the

piecemeal service i s increased, and there i s no evidence that

it

w i l l be, in fact evidence i s that i t w i l l l e s s e n , or the amount
of piece work increases, and there i s no evidence that i t

will,

or the number of doctors sharing the funds w i l l

decrease,

there

earnings

have

at the present rate for the expected f u t u r e /

Each

is

no

leveled off

evidence

that

suggests

this,

the

one of the pathologists charges rates identical
and

there

service.
by

the

is

no

specific

reward

for

and

t o the others,

seniority

or

length

of

The income of these pathologists i s expected to be set
fair

market

place

in

the

future.

The

defendant's
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accountant has high credibility, the plaintiff's expert is not
credible.

There

is no

reason

the defendant

should

pay the

plaintiff's experts.
9.

Each party has funds from which they may pay their

own attorney.

The Court finds that each of the parties have

employed their attorney and relied upon their attorney in good
faith.

Each party will bear their own attorney's fees.
10.

The value of the professional corporation stock is

as indicated by the defendant's accountant.
11.

The Court has considered the defendant's contention

that the plaintiff should be forced to either find employment or
charged as though she were working.

It is recognized that, in

this day and age, it is rare to see a 44 year old woman, in good
health, with
employment.

a college

degree, who has no serious plans for

The Court is also aware of the fact that she does

have an 8 year old child at home.
work eventually.

She should be encouraged to

She is not to be considered to have changed the

circumstances if she finds employment, so long as the earnings do
not exceed $1,300 or $1,400 per month.
DATED this Ql

day of March, 1987.

Ad
JOH*I F. WAHLQUIST, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this S O

day of March, 1987, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was
served upon the following:
Stephen W. Farr
FARR, KAUFMAN & HAMILTON
Attorney for Plaintiff
205 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Tim W. Healy
Attorney for Defendant
863 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

Vs^

A CARR, Secretary

PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT
1/20/87
ASSETS
Note:

The following values are approximate although the cash will
be equally divided.

CASH:

20,000
7,500
17,000
7,700
7,000
9,000
38,000

Continental Bank checking
Continental Bank liquid money
American 1st
Peoples 1st
Ogden 1st
American Savings
Merrill Lynch Ready Assets
Continental Bank

l T f fif)4

$ 119,204
HOUSE:

Gross value

$130,000

Mortgage
Net Value

34,000
$ 96,000

**

Award to plaintiff as shai
of assets

Pay off mortgage out of cash, leaving $85,204 in
available cash to be divided.

Bear Lake Cabin - our 1/3 value - $10,000. This should go to
plaintiff since the other owners are members of her fami ly
and since it was built at the request of her father who
asked defendant to help fund it.
CARS:

$11,000
No Equity
6 f 000

1985 Chevrolet Astro Van
1987 Chevrolet Spectrum
1984 Dodge Daytona
**

Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Defendant

Defendant does not know the equity in the Chevy
Spectrum or how it was paid for.

STOCKS:
Insured Income Properties (FFCA)
Several stocks at Merrill Lynch
MUNICIPAL BONDS:
Merrill Lynch
E«F. Hutton
A/0 1/31/87
SOUTH GATE LODGE

(Not liquid)

ASSOCIATES OF PATHOLOGY STOCK
BOAT:
$11,000 - Plaintiff
INSURANCE POLICIES Cash value of $4,099

E. F. Hutton

$37,057
74,192
116,628
$ 10,500
$ 14,521

$10,000
37,280

Page -2-

A OF P PENSION PLAN

$405,000

LOAN TO DEAN JOHNSON

$

HOME FURNISHINGS

% 12,000

TOTAL ASSETS

$857,0 08

900
- plaintiff

Page

- 3 JANET

House
$130,000
Cars
11,000
Cabin
10,000
Boat
11,000
Furniture 12,000
% of cash 42,602
\ of stock 18,644
Addition cash in lieu
of A of P stocks life ins.
cash value 9309.00
Share of Pension
Trust 183,950
TOTAL

***

VAL
; 26,791
18,644
10,000
10,500
14,521
4,099
900
116,628
220,421
6,000
$428,504

$428,504

Plaintiff will be liable for any taxes
on Pension trust or must roll it over
into an IRA, (the same as defendant
would have to do if he had the Pension
trust funds distributed) .

Share of cash
\ of stock
FFCA-E.F.Hut ton
South Gate Lodge
A of P Stock
Life Ins. cash value
Loan to Dean
Municipal bonds MLPF&S
and
E.F. Hutt
Pension trust share
Car
Total

257Z7£

/&&/>&§ Xtyh*
JM&/&*

Other items such as silverware, china, porcelain to be divided
equally, traded against other items of similar value or purchased
for cash for the value of the other parties interest.
Other items to be balanced against each other (e.g. photo equipment
to defendant, sewing machines to plaintiff; snowblower to defendant,
ATC 3 wheeler to plaintiff, stereo to defendant, plaintiff may
have Lenox china & Lunt silverware in return for \ of their value to
defendant or the parties may divide said china & silverware.
Municipal Bonds should to to defendant because he is the party in
the ongoing taxable situation with earned income and also because
he is assuming non-liquid assets such as South Gates Apartments
and Assoc, of Pathology stock, and since defendant is providing
other benefits such as insurance and health insurance, and is
assuming debt on the insurance loans. Plaintiff will also receive
less from the pension trust and therefore will have less consequence
than defendant on that item.
Defendant has provided bank accounts of more than $16,000 for each
of the 3 children. This money should not be considered in the
settlement, but defendant should remain as custodian jointly
with the children on h of the accounts and plaintiff should remain
as custodian jointly with the children on the other k of the accounts.
Since defendant will be providing nearly all of the childrens1
financial support, and since the child support money is taxable to him
and not to plaintiff, it should be stipulated in the divorce decree
that the children be listed as his dependents for tax purposes.

JOHNSON VS JOHNSON
TIMELINE OF MEDICAL TRAINING
JANET JOHNSON'S EARNINGS
WORKED AT THE ST. LOUIS
GLOBE DEMOCRAT

28 WEEKS © $90
52 WEEKS © $105
52 WEEKS © $115

$ 2,520
5,460
5.980

ff£960

COMPARE-

MARRIAGE
8/19/66
(PRE-MARRIAGE:
YAL JOHNSON-1 YEAR
MEDICAL SCHOOL
JANET JOHNSON-BA IN
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT)

LIVING COSTS
RENT
FOOD
UTILITIES
ENTERTAINMENT
TRAVEL
CLOTHING
MEDICAL
MISC.
FEES, BOOKS
SAVINGS & TAXES

^ .

150
100
50
0
50
MIN
0
50
75
475
X 31 MO
$14,725

ENTERED PRACTICE
ASSOCIATES OF PATHOLOGY

JOHNSON VS. JOHNSON
VALUATION OF MEDICAL LICENSE
SCENARIO 1
AV6, COLLEGE 6RADUATE INCOME VS. AV6. PATHOLOGIST INCOME
SCHEDUU A
CALCULATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF LICENSE

DR.
JOHNSON'S
PERIOD

YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
f
1
2
3
4
5
8
7
8

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
19%
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2902
2083
2004

A6E
45
46
47
48
49
58
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

INCOME FOR
COLLEGE
GRADUATE
$52,313
56,898
61,862
67,303
73,199
78,235
83,618
89,371
95,519
102,091
109,115
116,622
124,646
133,221
142,437
151,282
160,677
170,655

TAX
$14,648
15,931
17,327
18,845
20,496
21,906
23,413
25,024
26,745
28,585
38,552
32,654
34,901
37,302
39,882
42,359
44,990
47,783

INCOME FOR
C0LLE6E
GRADUATE INCOME FOR
AFTER TAX PATHOLOGIST
$37,667
40,967
44,555
48,458
52,703
56,329
60,205
64,347
68,774
73| 506
78,563
83,968
89,745
95,919
102,555
108,923
115,687
122,872

PRESENT

INCOME FOR

1PATHOLOGIST AFTER TAX 1t/ALUE FACTOR PRESENT
TAX

$129,560
141,972
155,572
207,274
227,131
248,890
272,734
298,862
327,492
358,866
393,246
430,919
472,201
517,437
567,008
621,327
688,850
746,076

$36,277
39,752
43,560
58,037
63,597
69,689
76,366
83,681
91,698
100,482
110,109
120,657
132,216
144,882
158,762
173,972
190,638
208,901

AFTERTAX
$93,283
102,220
112,012
149,237
163,534
179,201
196,368
215,181
235,794
258,384
283,137
310,262
339,985
372,555
408,246
447,355
490,212
537,175

DIFFERENCE
$55,616
61,253
67,457
100,779
110,831
122,872
136,163
150,834
167,020
184,878
204,574
226,294
250,240
276,636
305,691
338,432
374,525
414,303

0 9.39*
0.9561173
0.8740445
0.7990169
0.7304295
0.6677297
0.6104120
0.5580145
0.5101147
0.4663266
0.4262973
0.3897041
0.3562520
0.3256715
0.2977159
0.2721601
0.2487980
0.2274412
0.2079178

PRESENT VALUE OF LICENSE AT JANUARY 1, 1987
OFFSET FOR INVESTMENT IN LICENSE INCLUOING ACCRUED INTEREST TO JANUARY 1, 1987

VALUE
53,175
53,538
53,899
73,612
74,005
75,003
75,981
76,943
77,886
78,813
79,723
80,618
81,496
82,359
83,197
84,201
85,182
86,141
1,355,772
(199,346)

NET PRESENT VALUE OF LICENSE AT JANUARY 1, 1987 $1,156,426

CUMULATIVE
PRESENT
VALUE
53,175
106,713
160,612
234,224
308,229
383,232
459,213
536,156
614,042
692,855
772,578
853,1%
934,692
1,017,051
1,100,248
1,184,449
1,269,631
1,355,772

JOHNSON VS JOHNSON
SUMMARY OF VALUATION METHODS

$162,980
$2,785 MORE
PER MONTH

DR. JOHNSOr.'.: 1985 INCOME
(1986 - £ : 80,580)

VALUE OF MEDICAL PRACTICE: $154,997

$129,560
$6,437 MORE
PER MONTH

AVERAGE PAT:: J .OGIST INCOME

VALUE OF MEDICAL LICENSE: $1,156,426

$ 5 2 , v j ! v>

AVERAGE CC L E € GRADUATE INCOME

EXHIBIT
Child Support
Child's Name

Date of Birth

Age

ERIK VAL JOHNSON

October 30, 1971

16%

JENNIFER JOHNSON

January 22, 1973

14

JAMIE ANNE JOHNSON

November 30, 1978

8

Defendant had earnings in 1986 as follov.Ts:
a.

Regular income Associates of
Pathology

$ 150,580.00

b.

Interest and dividends

$

c.

Contribution to pension and profit...$
plan

10, 000 . 00
30,000.00

Total income for 1986

$ 190,580.00

Gross monthly income

$

15,881.66

The Uniform Child Support Schedule is calculated to gross monthly
earnings of $9,955.00. Accordingly, the defendant has gross
income of $5,926.00 per month above the maximum chart schedule.
For three children, child support is per the maximum chart income
level, plus $6.00 per month per child for each $89.00 of
additional gross income.

Accordingly, defendant should pay child

support at the maximum chart income level of $648.00 per month per
child, plus an additional $399.00 per month per child, for a total
of $1,047.00 per month per child.

JOHNSON vs. JOHNSON
Civil No. 94737
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